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LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE VETO OF RULES




The legislature and the executive, using their combined power to
enact a statute, always have been able to control the rulemaking of
administrative agencies. The current debate is whether the legisla-
ture alone should be able to nullify an agency's rule by means of a
"legislative veto" consisting of a resolution of a legislative commit-
tee, one house or both houses, which is not submitted to the execu-
tive for approval. The converse possibility also is emerging as a
serious issue - whether the executive alone should be able to nul-
lify an agency's rule by means of an "executive veto" which is not
submitted to the legislature.
On March 24, 1982 the United States Senate passed a bill au-
thorizing a "two-house veto," by which both houses of Congress
may veto the proposed rules of any agency by means of a concur-
rent resolution not submitted to the President for approval.1 A
similar bill is pending in the House. Numerous existing federal
* This article is adapted from a report submitted by the author as a consultant to the
Administrative Conference of the United States. The report has not been reviewed or
approved by the Administrative Conference. Portions of this article will be incorporated in
the author's forthcoming book entitled STATE ADMINiSTRATIvE LAW.
** Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. The author served as one of the two reporters
for the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1981 revision of the
MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT.
1. S. 1080, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 13 (1982), adding §§ 801-803 to Title 5, U.S.C. On the
distinction between joint resolutions and concurrent resolutions of Congress, see infra Ap-
pendix A. That appendix also examines the various meanings of the term "joint resolution"
in the states where it is pertinent to legislative control over agency rulemaking.
The Senate debate preceding adoption of S. 1080 included numerous references to the
experience of the states. See, e.g., 128 CONG. REC. S2582 (daily ed. March 23, 1982) (remarks
of Sen. Levin); id. at S2585 (remarks of Sen. Grassley); id. at S2592-93, 2601 (remarks of
Sen. Schmitt). The state experience was also mentioned in the congressional hearings and
reports cited infra notes 74 & 89. Neither the Senate debate nor the congressional hearings
and reports provide complete or systematic coverage of state law.
2. H.R. 746, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reported by the House Judiciary Committee,
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statutes authorize one-house or two-house vetoes of the rules or
other actions of designated agencies.' In Atkins v. United States
4
the Court of Claims, in a four to three decision, sustained a one-
house veto provision. More recently, the Ninth Circuit in Chadha
v. Immigration and Naturalization Service5 and the District of
Columbia Circuit in Consumer Energy Council of America v. Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission' held that one-house vetoes
are unconstitutional. Supreme Court review of the latter two cases
is pending.7
Meanwhile, the White House is asserting increasing control over
the rulemaking of agencies, moving in a direction that could lead
to an executive veto of rules. Prominent examples of this trend are
the January 29, 1981 Presidential Memorandum postponing pend-
ing rules8 and the February 17, 1981 Executive Order imposing
procedural controls and White House clearance on rules of execu-
tive agencies with a request that the independent agencies volunta-
and H.R. 1, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) both provide for the joint resolution as the vehicle
for congressional disapproval of agencies' rules. H.R. 4838, 97th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1981) pro-
vides for the joint resolution in some situations and the concurrent resolution in others; one
of the distinguishing factors is whether the agency is an executive agency or an independent
agency. H.R. 1776, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. (1981) provides for legislative disapproval of an
agency's rules, either by a concurrent resolution, or by a one-house resolution that is not
rejected by the other house within a designated time.
3. The most comprehensive discussions are in SUBCOMM. ON RULES OF THE HOUSE, HOUSE
COMM. ON RULES, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON REGULATORY REFORM
AND CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULES WITH A SUMMARY OF H.R. 1 [as introduced]
(Subcomm. Print 1981) and HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDIES ON THE
LEGISLATIVE VETO (Comm. Print 1980). Additional coverage is included in L. FISHER, THE
POLITICS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE 92-108 (1981); L. FISHER, THE
CONSTITUTION BETWEEN FRIENDS: CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT AND THE LAW 99-108 (1978); and
the sources cited infra notes 36-40.
4. 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978).
5. 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), consideration of juris. postponed until hearing on merits,
102 S. Ct. 87 (1981), argued before the Supreme Court Feb. 22, 1982, 50 U.S.L.W. 3687,
3694 (Mar. 2, 1982).
6. 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), appeal filed sub nom. Interstate Natural Gas Ass'n of
Amer. v. Consumer Energy Council of Amer., No. 81-2020 (U.S. May 1, 1982), 50 U.S.L.W.
3896 (May 11, 1982).
7. Supra notes 5 & 6.
8. Memorandum of Jan. 29, 1981, Postponement of Pending Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg.
11,227 (1981). The memorandum was addressed by President Reagan to the heads of the
executive departments, and did not purport to affect the independent agencies. On the dis-
tinction between executive departments and independent agencies, see infra notes 107-09
and accompanying text.
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rily comply.9
The states have been even more active than the federal govern-
ment with regard to both legislative and executive vetoes and other
forms of supervision of agency rulemaking. State approaches to-
ward legislative control fall into the following categories. Eleven
states have not adopted any system of legislative supervision; they
continue to rely on the general power of the legislature to enact
statutes whenever needed.1 Fifteen states have established advi-
sory committees to perform systematic review of agency rules and
to make recommendations for legislative action which must be
done by statute.1" One state has a one-house veto of agency rules.,2
9. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981). See infra text accompanying notes
107-09.
10. See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text. The states that have not adopted an
across-the-board system of legislative review of administrative agencies' rules are Arizona,
California, Delaware, Indiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Utah.
Some of these states have adopted systems pertaining to designated types of rules of des-
ignated agencies. See, e.g., ARiz. RE V. STAT. ANN. § 41-511.05 (1974 & Supp. 1982); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 35, § 1224.2 (Purdon 1980) (amended by Act No. 1981-83).
A bill creating a two-house veto system was held invalid before it went into effect in New
Hampshire. See infra note 18.
Some of the states without a system of legislative review have adopted a system of execu-
tive review. See infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 67 and accompanying text. The statutes that establish advisory com-
mittee systems subject to final legislative action by statute are ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-617, 6-
608 to -612 (1976); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 24-4-103(8)(d), -108 (Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 11.60, 120.545 (West Supp. 1981-1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 3A-104(e), (f) (Supp. 1981);
HAWAII REv. STAT. § 91-4.1 (Supp. 1981); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 11111 to 11116
(Supp. 1981-1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 40, § 40A (1978 & Supp. 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§
536.022, .037 (Vernon Supp. 1982); N.Y. LEGIs. LAW §§ 86-88 (Consol. Supp. 1981-1982); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 183.710 to .725 (1982); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-23-120 to -130 (Supp. 1981); TEx.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 5(g) (Vernon 1980); WASH. REv. CODE ch. 34.04
(amended by ch. 324, 1981 Wash. Laws); W. VA. CODE § 29A-3-11 (1980) (West Virginia
currently has an advisory committee system because its former two-house veto system was
held unconstitutional, see infra note 19); Wyo. STAT. §§ 28-8-102, 28-9-101 to -108 (1977).
The Maryland system is classified here as an advisory committee system because it func-
tions like one with regard to nonemergency rules. The Maryland committee exercises sus-
pensive powers over emergency rules.
Some of the states that are classified here as having advisory committee systems provide
that two houses or a legislative committee may suspend or nullify designated types of rules
of designated agencies. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 15B(c-1)(4) (Supp. 1981); 1981
Mo. LAWS, SB 200; TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 41a-1, § 6(b) (Vernon 1980).
The Georgia system is classified here as an advisory committee system subject to final
legislative action by statute, although the format of final legislative action in Georgia has a
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Eleven states have a two-house veto of agency rules;"3 additional
states had this type of system until it was declared unconstitu-
tional. 14 Nine states provide for final legislative action only by stat-
ute and authorize a legislative committee to suspend the effective-
ness of a rule for a limited time pending final legislative action. 15
special feature. If the legislature adopts a disapproval resolution by a two-thirds majority of
each house, the resolution need not be submitted to the governor. If a simple majority of
less than two-thirds adopts the resolution, it must be submitted to the governor, who may
veto the resolution. For classification purposes here, this system is regarded as one in which
the legislature, by a two-thirds majority, can override in advance any potential veto by the
governor. While this may not provide the same mechanisms for further deliberation and the
expression of public opinion that would accompany the mandatory submission of the mea-
sure to the governor followed by a possible veto and a new round of legislative activity to
override the veto, the Georgia system seems more like a statute than a two-house veto with-
out submission to the governor at all.
The systems of some states provide for final legislative action on agency rules by "joint
resolution." The meaning of this term varies from state to state. With regard to states where
a joint resolution must be submitted to the governor for approval or veto, a joint resolution
is classified here as if it were a statute. Where, on the other hand, a joint resolution need not
be submitted to the governor, a state system providing for final legislative action by joint
resolution is classified here as a two-house veto system. See infra Appendix A listing the
type of legislative action taken in connection with review of agency rules.
12. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 308 (West Supp. 1981). See infra notes 29-58 and accom-
panying text.
13. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-168(b) (West Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE §§ 67-454, -5217, -
5218 (Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 1007.01-.10 (SMITH-HURD 1981); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 77-426, -427 (1977 & Supp. 1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:969 (West. Supp. 1982);
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 24.235, .245, .250-.252 (Supp. 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-4-
401 to -412, 5-14-101 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 233B.067, .068 (1981) (amended by 1981
NEV. STAT. ch. 264); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:14B-4.1 to .9 (amended by 1981 N.J. Sess. Law
Serv. ch. 27 (West)); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 119.03(H), (I), (Page Supp. 1981), 1982 Ohio
Legis. Bull. at 36 (Anderson); VA. CODE § 9-6.14:9 (Supp. 1981).
Two-house veto systems are also on the statute books of Alaska and West Virginia but
have been held unconstitutional by the respective state supreme courts. See infra notes 17
& 19. On the basis of the remaining portions of the statutes, Alaska is classified here as a
state with a committee suspension system, see infra note 15, and West Virginia as a state
with an advisory committee system, see supra note 11.
A bill establishing a two-house veto system was held invalid before it went into effect in
New Hampshire. See infra note 18. Vermont repealed its two-house veto system in 1981.
The current system is classified infra note 16. See also infra notes 29-58.2 and accompany-
ing text.
14. See infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
15. ALA. CODE §§ 41-22-22 to -24 (Supp. 1981); ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.62.320, 24.20.400-.460
(1962) (Alaska's two-house veto system was held unconstitutional, infra note 17, and the
remaining portion of the Alaska statute is classified here as a committee suspension system);
Ky. REV. STAT. § 13.087 (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.965 (West Supp. 1982); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 84-901.01 to .02, -902(1) to (5), -904. -908 (Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 120-
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Three states and the 1981 revision of the Model State Administra-
tive Procedure Act provide for final legislative action only by stat-
ute pursuant to recommendations from an advisory committee; if
the committee finds a rule objectionable, the committee's objection
is published with the rule, and the agency has the burden of per-
suading the court that the rule is valid in any subsequent litigation
challenging the rule's validity.1"
The two-house veto has been held unconstitutional in recent
years by state supreme courts in Alaska, 17 New Hampshire,"8 and
West Virginia. 19 A lower court in Connecticut also held the two-
house veto unconstitutional, but the state supreme court disposed
of the case on other grounds and vacated the lower court's judg-
ment on the constitutional issue.20 A lower court in Montana re-
cently invalidated a statute that authorized a two-house resolution
of the legislature, without submission to the governor, to direct an
agency to change an existing rule or to adopt a new rule.21 The
court declined to decide the validity of another portion of the same
30.24 to .35, 150A-2(2a) (Supp. 1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 1-26-1(1) to (3), 1-26-38,
-38.1 (Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-5-104, -129 (Supp. 1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§
13.56 to .565, 227.018 (West Supp. 1981). See infra notes 74-88 and accompanying text.
The North Carolina system, classified here as a committee suspension system, also in-
volves the governor or the council of state performing an executive review function after the
committee of the legislature has determined that a rule is objectionable. See infra notes 115
& 116 and accompanying text.
16. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 17A.4, .8 (West 1978 & Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-32-
03.03 (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 842 (added by 1981 Vt. Acts No. 82, § 6. 1981 Vt.
Acts. No. 82 § 7 repealed the two-house veto system); MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE Acr
§ 3-204(d) (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws) (revised 1981)
[hereinafter cited as 1981 MSAPA].
The Montana system also provides for a shift in the burden of persuasion after the com-
mittee has objected, but the Montana statute also establishes a two-house veto system and
is classified here with other two-house veto systems. See supra note 13.
The North Carolina system also provides for a shift in the burden of persuasion after the
committee has objected, but that statute also confers suspensive powers upon the commit-
tee; consequently, North Carolina is classified here as having a committee suspension sys-
tem. See supra note 15.
For a discussion of systems in which the committee's objection shifts the burden of per-
suasion, see infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
17. State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1980).
18. Opinion of the Justices, 121 N.H. 552, 431 A.2d. 783 (1981).
19. State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1981).
20. Maloney v. Pac, 439 A.2d 349 (Conn. 1981).
21. Montana Taxpayers Ass'n v. Dep't of Revenue, No. 47126, (Mont., Lewis & Clark Co.,
March 18, 1982).
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statute that provides for a two-house veto of existing rules, but the
court's decision casts serious doubt upon the continued validity of
that provision.
The electorates of Alaska, Florida, Missouri, and Texas have re-
jected proposed state constitutional amendments that would have
authorized the two-house veto.22 Referenda on similar proposals
are pending in Connecticut and Missouri.2" No state has adopted a
constitutional provision authorizing the two-house veto. The elec-
torates of Michigan and South Dakota have adopted constitutional
amendments authorizing temporary suspension of agencies' rules
by a legislative committee pending final action by the legislature. 4
Executive oversight is more highly developed in some states than
in the federal government. In three states, rules cannot become ef-
fective unless signed by the governor.25 In other states and in the
22. The Alaska proposal would have added art. II, § 22 to the Alaska Constitution. The
proposed amendment, Legislative Resolve No. 5, SLA 1980, is in Alaska Stat. Const. art. II,
§ 22 (Supp. Oct. 1980). The defeat of this proposal at the November, 1980 referendum is
reported in Sturm, State Constitutional Developments During 1980, 70 NAT'L Civic REV.
22, 26 (1981).
The Florida proposal, Committee Substitute for Senate Joint Resolutions Nos. 619 and
1398 (1976), would have amended Fla. Const. art. I, § 18, 1976 Fla. Laws 933-34. Its defeat
at the November 1976 referendum is reported in Sturm, State Constitutional Developments
During 1976, 66 NAT'L Civic REV. 78, 83 (1977).
The Missouri proposal, S.J. Res. 23 (1976), would have amended Mo. Const. art. IV, § 8.
1976 Mo. Legis. Serv. 69 (Vernon). Its defeat at the August 1976 referendum is reported in
Sturm, State Constitutional Developments During 1976, 66 NAT'L Civic REV. 78, 86 (1977).
The Texas proposal, H.R.J. Res. 133 (1979), would have added art. III, § 66 to the Texas
Constitution. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 3232. Its defeat at the November, 1979 referendum is
reported in Sturm, State Constitutional Developments During 1979 and the 1970's, 69
NAT'L Civic REV. 33, 56 (1980).
23. The Connecticut proposal is Substitute H.R.J. Res. 64 adopted May 14, 1981, propos-
ing an amendment to Conn. Const. art. II. This proposal is to be voted upon at the general
election on November 2, 1982 or to be continued to the next session of the legislature
elected at that time. 1981 Conn. Legis. Serv. 806-07 (West).
The Missouri proposal is H.R.J. Res. 36 (1981), proposing the addition of art. IV, §§ 54-58
to Mo. Const., to be voted on in the general election in November, 1982, or a special election
to be called by the governor. 1981 Mo. Legis. Serv. 549-50 (Vernon).
24. Mich. Const. art. 4, § 37 (adopted in 1963); S.D. Const. art. III, § 30 (adopted in
1980).
25. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 91-3(c) (1976 & Supp. 1981); NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-908 (1976 &
Supp. 1980); Wyo. STAT. § 28-9-106 (1977). In addition, the governor of Arizona has issued
an executive order which could be viewed as his assertion of the right to give informal ap-
proval to all rules before they become effective. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
Governors in many other states undoubtedly exercise significant informal influence before
certain agencies adopt certain rules.
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1981 Model Act, rules become effective without the governor's sig-
nature, but the governor may veto any rule."' California has a va-
riation of this system; the Office of Administrative Law reviews all
rules and can suspend those it finds objectionable, subject to final
action by the governor.17 In still other states, rules can be vetoed
by the combined action of the governor and a legislative
committee.28
This Article begins with a discussion of the constitutional and
policy problems arising from the one-house or two-house veto. The
conclusion of this part of the Article is that these systems are
neither clearly constitutional nor clearly unconstitutional, except
in those jurisdictions where they have been expressly rejected by
the courts. The concept may be justifiable in jurisdictions where it
has not been expressly rejected only if effective supervision of the
agencies is needed and no other mechanism can provide that su-
pervision. Justification of the one-house or two-house veto de-
pends, therefore, on the availability of alternative means of super-
vising the agencies that are reasonably effective and free from the
serious constitutional and policy problems that accompany the
one-house or two-house veto.
Next, this Article examines other models of legislative and exec-
utive control over agencies. The great majority of the states have
adopted systems that do not include the one-house or two-house
veto, and most activities of the federal government are conducted
without the availability of this veto. The widespread use and ap-
parent acceptability of systems other than the one-house or two-
In Connecticut, the governor must approve an emergency rule before it is eligible for ex-
pedited processing by the legislative rules review committee. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-
168(b) (West Supp. 1981).
On the general requirement that a governor sign rules before they become effective, see
infra note 105 and accompanying text.
26. IND. CODE ANN. § 4-22-2-5 (Burns Supp. 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 17A.4(6) (Supp.
1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:970 (West Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.022 (Vernon
Supp. 1982); NEv. REV. STAT. § 416.060 (1979); 1981 MSAPA, supra note 16, at § 3-302. See
also infra notes 27 & 28 and accompanying text.
On the gubernatorial veto of rules, see generally infra notes 111-14 and accompanying
text.
27. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11349-11349.9 (West 1980). See infra notes 112-14 and accompa-
nying text.
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 120-30.24 to .35, 150A-2(2a) (1978 & Supp. 1981); Wyo. STAT. §
28-9-106 (1977). See infra notes 115 & 116 and accompanying text.
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house veto lead to the conclusion that the veto is generally unnec-
essary and undesirable at the present time.
II. ONE-HOUSE OR Two-HOUSE VETO
Serious questions of constitutional law and public policy arise
from the one-house or two-house veto. Almost all courts and all
state constitutional referenda that have addressed the issue have
rejected the veto. Some legislators vigorously advocate it, yet only
a small number of states have established the veto by statute.
Scholarly commentary is mixed. Each of the major components of
the debate will be reviewed.
A. Separation of Powers
The courts that recently have rejected the one-house or two-
house veto show remarkable consistency in their reasoning.29 All
the decisions are based on the separation of powers. The underly-
ing theory is that once the legislature has enacted a statute dele-
gating authority to an administrative agency, no legislative action
except another statute may nullify or amend the enabling statute
or the agency's action.
This result rests on two premises. First, when an agency takes
action pursuant to an enabling statute, the agency is engaged in
the execution of the laws and is therefore carrying out an executive
function. Although statutorily created administrative agencies are
allowed to perform executive functions, neither the legislature nor
any sub-unit of the legislature may perform such functions. Thus,
any legislative intervention in the execution of the laws by means
other than a statute is an encroachment on the domain of the exec-
utive branch and violates the separation of powers. The second
premise is that, for purposes of this discussion, neither a one-house
nor a two-house resolution of the legislature qualifies as a statute,
because neither is presented to the chief executive for approval or
29. The cases synthesized here are Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv.,
supra note 5; Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
supra note 6; State v. A.L.L V.E. Voluntary, supra note 17; Opinion of the Justices, supra
note 18; and State ex rel. Barker u. Manchin, supra note 19. The position of the Montana
trial court, supra note 21, is fully consistent with these cases, although directed to a slightly
different issue.
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VETO OF AGENCY RULES
veto; additionally, a one-house resolution violates the principle of
bicameralism.
The only recent case that upholds a one-house veto against a
separation of powers challenge is the four to three decision of the
Court of Claims in Atkins v. United States.3 0 The statute at issue
provided that the President's recommendations regarding the sala-
ries of certain government officials would become effective unless
either house of Congress adopted a resolution of disapproval
within thirty days. Limiting itself to this statute, the court held
that the one-house veto system was valid. The effect of a one-
house resolution of disapproval in this context simply would pre-
serve the status quo because the statute would remain in effect and
the President's recommendation would fail to take effect. Thus,
the one-house resolution would not change the law. Further, be-
cause setting salaries is clearly a legislative function, the one-house
resolution of disapproval would not interfere with any essential ex-
ecutive function.
Atkins is significant as an expression of the view that the one-
house or two-house veto is not inherently unconstitutional. But
beyond this proposition, the significance of the decision may be
quite limited in view of the court's insistence that it was consider-
ing only the statute at issue in the case. This statute clearly in-
volved a less serious assault on the principle of separation of pow-
ers than the statutes that recently have been invalidated by the
state supreme courts of Alaska,31 New Hampshire,32 and West Vir-
ginia.33 In each of these state cases, the challenged statute estab-
lished an across-the-board system for the two-house veto of the
rules of all agencies in the state. The statute at issue in Atkins,
however, is not so easily distinguishable from those statutes which
were invalidated by two other recent federal cases. In Consumer
Energy Council v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 4 the
District of Columbia Circuit invalidated a statute that authorized
either house of Congress to veto the rule of a specific agency re-
garding natural gas pricing. In Chadha v. Immigration and Natu-
30. Supra note 4.
31. Supra note 17.
32. Supra note 18.
33. Supra note 19.
34. Supra note 6.
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ralization Service,35 the Ninth Circuit invalidated a statute that
authorized either house of Congress to veto a stay of deportation
granted by the Attorney General. One possible distinction is that
Atkins sustained a one-house disapproval of the President's rec-
ommendation before it became effective, while Consumer Energy
Council and Chadha invalidated systems under which one house
could annul agency action that had already taken effect. This dis-
tinction indicates that the one-house or two-house veto is on
stronger constitutional ground when applied to proposed agency
action in "report-and-wait" systems3" than when applied to agency
action already in effect. Another distinction between the decisions
in Atkins and the two other federal cases, however, may result
from a conflict of judicial opinion regarding the underlying issue of
separation of powers.
Some scholars assert that the one-house or two-house veto is in-
herently unconstitutional," others that it is clearly constitu-
tional, 8 others that it is of questionable validity,3 9 and others that
35. Supra note 5.
36. See infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
37. An influential early statement was Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration
by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 HA~v. L. REV. 569 (1953). More recently,
a similar view was taken in Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control
of the Executive, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 983 (1975). See also Taylor, Legislative Vetoes and the
Massachusetts Separation of Powers Doctrine, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1 (1979).
Not surprisingly, Presidents of the United States consistently have argued that the one-
house or two-house veto is unconstitutional. A recent congressional study reports:
Since the enactment of the first legislative veto provision in 1933, the Execu-
tive Branch has opposed this method of congressional oversight. Every Presi-
dent from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Jimmy Carter has strongly argued that the
veto is an unconstitutional infringement upon the duty and obligation of the
Chief Executive to enforce the law. It is interesting to note that the Reagan
Administration on several occasions during the 97th Congress has opposed the
legislative veto on constitutional grounds, notwithstanding the President's sup-
port of the device during the campaign and the endorsement of the veto by the
Republican National Convention.
SUBCOMM. ON RULES OF THE HousE, HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., BACK-
GROUND INFORMATION ON REGULATORY REFORM AND CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF AGENCY
RULES WITH A SUMMARY OF H.R. 1 [as introduced] 15 (Subcomm. Print 1981) (footnote
omitted).
38. Schwartz, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution: A Reexamination, 46 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 351 (1978). Two members of the U.S. Senate have published scholarly argu-
ments in favor of the validity of the legislative veto. Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A
Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND.
L.J. 323 (1977); Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Con-
[Vol. 24:79
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it may be acceptable in some circumstances but not in others.40
Still other scholars assert that although the separation of powers
issue may be a useful means of approaching a general examination
of political philosophy, the issue should not be regarded as a
source of solutions for resolving the constitutionality of the one-
house or two-house veto.
This article will withhold any opinion on separation of powers or
any other doctrinal issue. Instead, this article will offer an overall
evaluation of the constitutional and policy issues on the basis of
the cumulative examination of all major issues, including the im-
pact of the state constitutional referenda.
B. Delegation
The major argument in favor of the one-house or two-house veto
rests on the theory of delegation. 42 According to this approach,
when the legislature delegates authority to an administrative
agency, the legislature should be able to attach conditions to con-
trol the manner in which the delegated authority will be exercised.
Some types of conditions would be unconstitutional, such as condi-
tions that required the agency to engage in invidious discrimina-
tion or to violate due process when implementing the statute. The
provision for a one-house or two-house veto, however, is asserted to
be a valid condition within the "reasonable and proper" range of
stitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 455 (1977).
39. K. C. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.6 (1982 Supp. to 2d. ed.); Bruff &
Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Ve-
toes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1977); Henry, The Legislative Veto: In Search of Constitu-
tional Limits, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 735 (1979); Nathanson, Separation of Powers and Ad-
ministrative Law: Delegation, the Legislative Veto, and the "Independent" Agencies, 75
Nw. U.L. REV. 1064 (1981).
40. Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The Executive on a
Leash?, 56 N.C. L. REV. 423 (1978); Note, Congressional Oversight of Administrative Dis-
cretion: Defining the Proper Role of the Legislative Veto, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 1018 (1977);
Note, The Constitutionality of the Legislative Veto, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 123 (1981);
Fisher, Congress Can't Lose on Its Veto Power, Washington Post, Feb. 21, 1982, inserted in
128 CONG. REC. S2587-88 (daily ed. March 23, 1982) (in remarks of Sen. Schmitt).
41. Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional Framework,
52 IND. L.J. 367 (1977).
42. The delegation argument is urged in the sources cited supra note 37 and was made
repeatedly during the debate in the U.S. Senate preceding the vote in favor of the two-house
veto system cited supra note 1. See 128 CONG. REC. S2571-2604 (daily ed. March 23, 1982).
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legislative action.
Some legislators argue that the one-house or two-house veto is
the only way to make sure that the will of the legislature, as ex-
pressed in the enabling statute, is not thwarted by the actions of
the agencies. 43 According to this argument, the one-house or two-
house veto is needed as a protection against the violation of the
separation of powers that would otherwise be perpetrated by the
agencies. This approach uses the separation of powers principle to
support the one-house or two-house veto, in contrast to the ap-
proach discussed under the previous heading, which relies on sepa-
ration of powers as the basis for rejecting the veto.
C. Rejection of Proposed State Constitutional Amendments
Alaska, Florida, Missouri, and Texas recently have given their
citizens an opportunity to vote on proposed state constitutional
amendments dealing with the one-house or two-house veto. In all
four states, the people rejected proposed amendments that would
have authorized the veto as a system applicable across-the-board
to the rules of all administrative agencies. 44 In rejecting the pro-
posed constitutional amendments, the people of these states ex-
pressed their disagreement with the respective legislatures that
had recommended adopting the amendments. The results of these
referenda merit serious attention, not only in the states where the
votes took place, but in all states as well as the federal
government.45
D. Practical Effects
The debate on the one-house or two-house veto has included a
discussion of the effects this system is likely to produce in govern-
ment practices. One objection is that a veto system would increase
the legislative workload- if the legislature had to review all rules or
43. In addition to sources cited supra notes 37 & 41, see LEGISLATIVE IMPROVEMENT AND
MODERNIZATION COMMITTEE, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, RESTORING THE
BALANCE: LEGISLATIVE REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS 7-10 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as RESTORING THE BALANCE]. This source was recently updated. See infra note 46.1.
44. Supra note 22. See also infra Appendix B which suggests that referenda rejecting
proposed state constitutional amendments are significant statements of constitutional law
and public policy.
45. See Appendix B.
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all proposed rules in order to decide whether to exercise the veto.'8
A response to this objection is that if the legislature wishes to
maintain effective supervision over the agencies by means of exer-
cising the traditional legislative power to enact a statute, the legis-
lature still must review all rules or proposed rules and also must
undertake the relatively cumbersome process of enacting a statute.
This process requires even more legislative effort than would be
needed for a one-house or two-house veto. A related question is
whether a one-house or two-house veto system would require a
large legislative support staff. Preliminary data on number of staff
personnel and annual cost shows wide variations among states but
does not indicate that the one-house or two-house veto system re-
quires more staff or funds than other types of legislative oversight
systems. 46
Another issue is whether the availability of a one-house or two-
house veto will encourage the legislature to delegate power to the
executive in broader terms or on a broader range of subjects.47
This feature of the veto is viewed as an advantage by some and as
a danger by others.
A third question is whether the availability of a one-house or
two-house veto will discourage the agencies from promulgating
rules at all. The consequence would be that agencies would develop
new policy on an ad hoc basis in the context of adjudicating indi-
vidual cases. Such ad hoc policy decisions may be beyond the prac-
tical reach of the legislative veto system.48 The prospect of a de-
46. See, e.g., 128 CONG. REC. S2592-93 (daily ed. March 23, 1982) (remarks of Sens. Byrd
and Schmitt).
46.1 Jones, Legislative Review of Administrative Rules: An Update, NATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES: STATE LEGISLATIVE REPORT, Vol. 7, No. 4 (1982). The state
showing the highest annual cost is Illinois ($600,000), classified here as a two-house veto
system state. Supra note 13. The next highest annual cost is New York ($585,000), classified
here as an advisory system state, supra note 11, and the third highest is Florida ($350,000),
also an advisory system state, supra note 11. Many states, including some with two-house
veto systems, show no cost at all, evidently because the cost of staffing the role review pro-
cess is not accounted for separately.
47. See, e.g., 128 CONG. REc. S2595-97 (daly ed. March 23, 1982) (remarks of Sen.
Danforth).
48. On the general preferability of rulemaking rather than adjudication as a means of
developing policy, see, e.g., 1 K. C. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.38 (2d ed.
1978); B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 189-90 (1976); 1981 MSAPA, supra note 16, at §
2-104(4) and Comments.
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crease in agency rulemaking is welcome to some people, but others
fear that a shift from rulemaking to adjudication as the means of
developing policy may make the agencies' policies more difficult for
the citizen to ascertain or for the courts to monitor effectively. The
one-house or two-house veto, however, may not deter agency
rulemaking any more than would a vigorous program of legislative
review based on the legislature's power to enact statutes.
A fourth area of concern is that a one-house or two-house veto
system could have a destabilizing effect on governmental policy.49
Assume, for example, that a controversial new policy has been em-
bodied in a statute after extensive bargaining and compromising
among the two houses of the legislature and the chief executive.
Pursuant to the statute, an agency adopts rules which are in turn
submitted to the legislature for review under a one-house veto sys-
tem. By the time these rules are submitted, either house may con-
clude that a different policy is preferable to the one that was em-
bodied in the statute. Either house may therefore wish to veto a
rule that conforms to the enabling statute as a means of asserting
the new policy preference of that house. The possibility of this
type of action by either house will, of course, attract the attention
of lobbyists, who will not hesitate to importune the legislators dur-
ing the rule review process.
This concern may be answered, to some extent, by the observa-
tion that the legislature always retains the option of repealing or
amending the enabling statute; thus, governmental policy always is
tentative. Futhermore, the legislature always is subject to lobbying
by persons wishing to have the policy changed. Of course, a
change in policy by the action of a single house of the legislature
may be easier to accomplish than if a statute is required; however,
the statute establishing the one-house or two-house veto system
could place limits on the reasons why a veto could be exercised.
For example, the statute could authorize a veto only if the agency's
action is contrary to the intent of the enabling statute or otherwise
beyond the authority delegated.to the agency.
49. In the Consumer Energy Council case, supra note 6, the court pointed out that the
House of Representatives, when adopting the one-house veto resolution that was at issue in
that case, knowingly departed from the policy that had been incorporated in the underlying
statute. 673 F.2d at 467-68.
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A final question is whether the one-house or two-house veto will
prevent effective administration. This question requires considera-
tion under each of two possible forms that the system may incor-
porate. One option is the "report and wait" mechanism. This
mechanism delays the effective date of all rules for a designated
number of days, during which one or both houses of the legislature
have the opportunity to exercise their veto, and after which the
veto is no longer available.5 0 The practical difficulty with this sys-
tem is that the public interest may require adopting rules more
quickly than this system permits. This difficulty is especially sig-
nificant in states where the legislature meets for relatively short
and widely separated sessions. A familiar solution is to authorize
agencies to adopt emergency rules that can take effect immedately
without having to wait for the expiration of the normal period of
time.5 1 To prevent the agencies from abusing the privilege of
adopting emergency rules, some states have imposed special con-
50. The bill adopted by the U.S. Senate on March 24, 1982, supra note 1, establishes a
"report and wait" system. With some exceptions, the bill provides a 45-day waiting period
before rules can become effective. This period is extended if, within the 45 days, the appro-
priate committee of either house reports a resolution of disapproval or is discharged from
further consideration of such a resolution. From the date that a committee reports or is
discharged, either house has 30 days in which to adopt a resolution of disapproval, and the
other house then has an additional 30 days thereafter, the rule remaining ineffective unless
either house defeats a resolution of disapproval. If Congress adjourns sine die before expira-
tion of the waiting period, the rule remains ineffective and the waiting period starts to run
when Congress reconvenes.
All the states that have adopted across-the-board systems of the two-house veto, supra
note 13, provide a waiting period during which the legislature may adopt a resolution to
prevent a proposed rule from becoming effective (with exceptions for emergency rules in
some states). In Kansas, Montana, Nevada, and Virginia, the two-house veto can be exer-
cised only upon proposed rules during the waiting period before their effectiveness. In the
other two-house veto states (Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, New Jersey,
and Ohio), the two-house veto can be exercised either upon proposed rules during the wait-
ing period before their effectiveness or after the rules have become effective (subject to limi-
tations in some of these states). The Oklahoma one-house veto system applies to existing
rules. See supra note 12.
51. The bill adopted by the U.S. Senate on March 24, 1982, supra notes 1 & 50, permits
emergency rules to take effect immediately. Connecticut provides an expedited "report and
wait" system for emergency rules and requires the governor to approve the agency's finding
of an emergency. Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Virginia permit emergency rules to take
immediate effect. Nevada authorizes the legislative committee to expedite or waive review
when necessary. New Jersey permits emergency rules to take effect, with the governor's ap-
proval, but only for 60 days, unless a concurrent resolution extends their effectiveness for
one more 60-day period. Supra notes 12 & 13.
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trols such as requiring the written approval of the governor before
any agency may adopt an emergency rule.2
Another optional form of the one-house or two-house veto is to
permit the rules to go into effect before the legislature reviews
them and to authorize one or both houses to nullify existing
rules. 53 This form of the veto, while permitting agencies to take
immediate action, adds an air of tentativeness to agency action un-
til legislative review has been completed.
E. Necessity and the Least Burdensome Means
The cumulative effect of the above discussion leads to the con-
clusion that the one-house or two-house veto is neither clearly con-
stitutional nor clearly unconstitutional, except in those jurisdic-
tions Where it has been expressly rejected by the courts. In the
remaining jurisdictions, the veto occupies a constitutional twilight
zone, and the validity of the veto is seriously suspect because of
the persuasive force of the determinations in some jurisdictions
that the system violates basic.notions of separation of powers.
In jurisdictions where the question is still open, the one-house or
two-house veto may be justified if it is demonstrated to be neces-
sary and if it is the least burdensome means of meeting that neces-
sity. The doctrine of necessity does not permit the government to
engage in conduct that clearly violates the constitution, but neces-
sity may be taken into account in deciding borderline questions of
constitutionality.54 The doctrine of necessity calls for a showing
that there is a need for some type of remedy and that the particu-
lar remedy under examination is appropriate under the circum-
stances. One measure of appropriateness is whether the remedy is
the least burdensome means of solving the problem. The concept
of the least burdensome means is familiar in many of the balancing
52. Connecticut and New Jersey. Supra note 51.
53. Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, and Oklahoma.
Supra note 50.
54. See infra notes 55-57. See also 1 A. HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
VIRGINIA 444 (1974). For a related discussion of the "constitutional reason of state" which
may exist even when a war or other extreme emergency does not, and which may encourage
the de facto expansion of governmental powers, see A.S. MILLER, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 200-
28 (West Nutshell Series 1977).
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tests employed by the courts.5 5 The most frequent contexts in
which courts use the concept are those involving free speech or
other individual rights.56 It is also used in the more abstract con-
text that *considers the burden on interstate commerce. 57
By analogy, the concept of the least burdensome means also
should indicate that where a governmental need can be met by va-
rious alternative systems, preference sho-uld be given to the system-
that imposes the least "burden" on the prevailing notions of con-
stitutional government. In other words, a court should not rely on
the doctrine of necessity to validate a system that is seriously sus-
pect under general standards of constitutional analysis if the as-
serted need can be satisfied by another system that is clearly con-
stitutional or is at least on stronger constitutional ground than the
system under challenge. 8
The preceding examination of some practical effects of the one-
house or two-house veto is not an adequate basis for determining
whether this system satisfies the asserted need to supervise the
agencies in a manner that renders the use of this system essential.
Alternative methods of satisfying the need must be examined
before the need for the veto can be appraised. Although this article
does not reflect empirical studies of the functioning of systems in
the federal and the several state governments, one indisputable
fact is that most states have not established the one-house or two-
house veto at all. Furthermore, the federal government has estab-
lished the veto only for designated types of rules, and not as an
across-the-board system. These facts suggest that the one-house or
55. See, e.g., Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudication: An
Analysis, A Justification, and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. Rxv. 971 (1974); L. TRIBE, AmERi-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 999, n.17 (1978). The Florida Supreme Court has developed the
concept in various settings, e.g., Pomponio v. Claridge of Pompano Condominium, Inc., 378
So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1979) (impairment of the obligation of contracts); Kluger v. White, 281
So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973) (access to courts); State v. Leone, 118 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 1960) (exercise of
the police power).
56. See, e.g., L. TRME, supra note 55, at 410, 586, 684-87, 695, 722-24, 766-67, 771-72, 780-
81, 791-92, 808-09, 846-59, 952, 961-62.
57. See, e.g., L. TRME, supra note 55, at 335, 342.
58. This is somewhat analogous to the doctrine that when a statute is susceptible to two
interpretations, one constitutional and the other unconstitutional, a court will apply the
constitutional interpretation, thereby avoiding the need to hold the statute invalid. See, e.g.,
National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974); Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116 (1958).
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two-house veto may not be an indispensable feature of contempo-
rary state or federal government.
F. Policy Arguments
The desirability of the one-house or two-house veto, as a matter
of policy, has been contested vigorously. Policy preferences blend
with arguments of constitutionality, practicality, and necessity.
The recent debate in the United States Senate preceding adoption
of the bill providing a two-house veto system provides an assort-
ment of policy statements generally favoring the system.58 -1 Nu-
merous institutions, however, have expressed vigorous objections.
These institutions include the Administrative Conference of the
United States, the American Bar Association (ABA), and the ABA
Commission on Law and the Economy. Additionally, the referenda
rejecting the one-house or two-house veto in proposed state consti-
tutional amendments are significant statements of public policy as




III. OTHER MODELS OF LEGISLATIVE CONTROL
In those jurisdictions that have not adopted the one-house or
two-house veto, the mechanisms for legislative control over agency
action can be classified into a few models. The basic features of
each model are sketched in this part of the paper. Hybrid systems,
incorporating elements from more than one of the models, will be
discussed under a later heading.59
A. Nonsystematic Oversight
The federal government and eleven states have not adopted any
across-the-board system of legislative control over the agencies,"0
but a few states,"- as well as the federal government,6 2 have estab-
lished one-house or two-house veto systems with regard to the
rules of designated agencies, and the United States Senate has
58.1 See supra notes 1, 42, 46 & 47.
58.2 See infra note 118. See also supra notes 22 & 24 and infra Appendix B.
59. See infra notes 115 & 116 and accompanying text.
60. Supra note 10.
61. Id.
62. Supra note 3.
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passed a bill to establish an across-the-board two-house veto of
agency rules.6 3 The dominant model in the federal government and
the eleven states is, at least for the time being, a model of nonsys-
tematic oversight.
In these jurisdictions, the legislature can veto the rule of any
agency by enacting a statute that either amends the enabling stat-
ute so as to repeal or adjust the agency's authority or directly nul-
lifies the agency's rule. The legislature also has other traditional
powers. It may minimize the amount of agency discretion by enact-
ing tightly-written enabling statutes. It may suspend or withdraw
an agency's rulemaking authority. Finally, the legislature may ex-
ert influence on agencies through such techniques as the appropri-
ations process, legislative investigations, participation in the ap-
pointment of agency personnel, and the handling of constituents'
casework arising from their dealings with the agencies.
This traditional approach poses no constitutional problems." It
is often viewed as inadequate because it fails to provide a system-
atic method for bringing agency rules to the attention of the legis-
lature.6 5 This criticism may not always be justified. For example,
during the recent debate in the United States Senate, before the
adoption of the bill establishing the across-the-board two-house
veto, a proponent of the measure observed that it would not cause
a significant increase in the workload of Congress, because the
standing committees already engage in comprehensive review of
the agencies' rules pursuant to the traditional power of Congress to
enact a statute as a means of controlling an agency's rulemaking.6 6
63. Supra note 1.
64. An exception might arise if the legislature attempted to veto the rule of an agency
that derives its existence and powers directly from the constitution. See, e.g., Whitehead v.
Rogers, 223 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1969). Along similar lines, see 1981 MSAPA, supra note 16,
which explains that, for purposes of this Act, the term "agency ... does not include the
governor in the exercise of powers derived directly and exclusively from the constitution of
this State."
The recent Montana trial court decision, supra note 21, implies that the constitutional
outcome may be different between a two-house veto of existing agency rules and a two-
house directive that requires an agency to adopt or amend a rule. The court held the latter
procedure unconstitutional, but expressly withheld deciding the validity of the former. Ar-
guably, the separation of powers issues are virtually identical in each type of situation.
65. See, e.g., RESTORING THE BALANCE, supra note 43, at 8; 128 CONG..REc. § 2584 (daily
ed. March 23, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Grassley).
66. Supra note 46.
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Furthermore, if an agency proposes or adopts a rule that is seri-
ously questionable on either legal or policy grounds, the rule is
likely to attract the attention of affected parties or their lobbyists,
who will not hesitate to bring the matter to the attention of the
legislature. Affected parties thus can serve a screening function in
aid of legislative review of agency rulemaking.
B. Advisory Committee Systems
Fifteen states have established systems in which a special rules
review committee or an appropriate legislative standing committee
systematically reviews proposed or existing rules, or both, and
makes recommendations to the legislature which, in these systems,
may act only by statute.6 7 The only difference between this system
and the nonsystematic method of legislative oversight is that the
advisory committee system is truly a system in that it provides a
mechanism for the methodical performance of the rule review
function. The advisory committee system is clearly constitutional,
because final legislative action is only by statute and the role of the
committee is purely advisory.
Variations of the advisory committee model are found in some of
the fifteen states. In some states, the agency must respond to the
committee's comments on the rule.6 8 Some states require any ob-
jection by the committee to be published with the rule.6 9 In "re-
port and wait" systems, the effectiveness of all agency rules, except
emergency rules, is delayed for a designated period after the
agency has promulgated the rules. This allows time for the advi-
sory committee to perform its review and for the legislature to en-
act a statute before the rules take effect.70 Under "sunset" provi-
sions, rules have a. limited duration, and they automatically
67. Supra note 11.
68. Florida (agency's failure to respond to committee's objection is deemed to be agency
decision to withdraw the proposed rule); Washington (after receipt of objection from com-
mittee, agency must conduct public hearing and then report back to committee). Statutes
are cited supra note 11.
69. Florida and Washington, cited supra note 11.
70. Advisory committees can review proposed rules in Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Maine,
Maryland, Missouri, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyo-
ming. Statutes are cited supra note 11. Availability of advisory committee review of pro-
posed rules is the basis for classifying these states as having "report and wait" systems.
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terminate after the specified time unless the legislature enacts a
statute to prolong the life of selected rules or to exempt them from
the "sunset" timetable. 1 Another variation of the advisory com-
mittee system is found in jurisdictions where the committee has
standing to bring suit to challenge the validity of any rule.72
In some of the states with advisory committee systems, legisla-
tors appear to be satisfied that the system gives them adequate
control over agency rulemaking; but, in other states with similar
systems, legislators experience frustration in attempting to control
the agencies.7 3 The distinction between the satisfactory and unsat-
isfactory evaluations of the advisory committee system may relate
to such factors as the size and quality of the committee's staff, the
ability of this staff to communicate informally with the staff of the
rulemaking agency, the extent to which the governor and the legis-
lature support the committee, and the leadership ability of key in-
dividuals, especially during the formative period of the system.
The likelihood of success also is increased if the enabling statutes
and the agencies' rules are well written.
C. Suspension by Committee
Nine states authorize temporary suspension of a rule by a com-
mittee, subject to final legislative action by statute.74 In some of
these states, suspension occurs before the effective date of the
rule;75 in other states, the legislature may suspend rules that al-
71. Colorado pioneered the "sunset" concept. Maine adopted a "sunset" system but re-
pealed it in 1981. Statutes are cited supra note 11.
72. Florida, cited supra note 11.
73. See, e.g., SUBCoMM. ON RULES OF THE HOUSE, HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, 96TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., REGULATORY REFORM AND CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULES: HEARINGS ON
H.R. 1776, THE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING REFORM ACT, AND RELATED MEASURES
(Comm. Print 1980), which includes relatively favorable comments on advisory committee
systems by legislators from Florida (Part I, at 646, statement by Rep. Kiser) and Maryland
(Part III at 5, statement by Rep. Riley), and relatively unfavorable comments based on the
ineffectiveness of the advisory committee system by a legislator from Texas (Part II at 106,
statement by Sen. Semos). The present author, in conversations with legislators and their
staffs, has heard widely varying appraisals of advisory committee systems from people in
states that have such systems.
74. Supra note 15.
75. Committees can review and suspend proposed rules before effectiveness in Alabama,
Alaska, Kentucky, North Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. Statutes are
cited supra note 15. In some of these states, committees also can review and suspend ex-
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ready have become effective. 6
No state court has decided a case on the sole basis of the validity
of a committee suspension system. In each of the state supreme
court decisions that recently invalidated a two-house veto -
Alaska, New Hampshire, and West Virginia - the challenged stat-
ute combined a committee suspension feature with a two-house
veto. The holding of each case was that the two-house veto was
unconstitutional. The Alaska court disclaimed any opinion on the
validity of the committee suspension feature of the statute. 7 In
dictum, the New Hampshire court implied that the committee sus-
pension feature of the statute was not objectionable.78 The West
Virginia court in dictum, however, expressed disapproval of the
committee suspension concept.79 Committee suspension was not an
issue in the Montana trial court decision.8"
The voters of Michigan and South Dakota have adopted state
constitutional amendments that authorize a legislative committee
to suspend rules that agencies have adopted during the interim be-
tween legislative sessions; the legislature thus has an opportunity
to act before the rules become effective."'
In states where a constitutional amendment or a holding of a
court have not determined the validity of the committee suspen-
sion system, the system poses a constitutional question that falls
between the clear constitutionality of the advisory committee sys-
tem and the serious question regarding the validity of the one-
isting rules. See infra note 76. The North Carolina committee is subject to executive as well
as legislative review. See infra notes 115 & 116 and accompanying text.
76. Committees can review and suspend existing rules in Alabama (only if adopted before
Oct. 1, 1982), Alaska, Minnesota, Nebraska (with a "sunset" system), North Carolina (sub-
ject to executive as well as legislative review, see infra notes 115 & 116 and accompanying
text), South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. Statutes are cited supra note 15. In some
of these states, committees also can review and suspend proposed rules before effectiveness.
See supra note 75.
77. Supra note 17.
78. Supra note 18.
79. Supra note 19.
80. Supra note 21.
81. Supra note 24. The Michigan system is classified here as a two-house veto system,
supra note 13, because the statute includes that mechanism, although the constitutional
amendment does not expressly or even impliedly authorize a two-house veto. South Dakota
is classified here as a committee suspension system subject to final legislative action by
statute. Supra notes 15, 75 & 76.
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house or two-house veto. The committee suspension system resem-
bles the advisory committee system to the extent that each re-
quires the final action of the legislature to be by statute. On the
other hand, the committee suspension system resembles the one-
house or two-house veto system to the extent that each permits the
legislature, by taking action other than by statute, to interfere with
the effectiveness of a rule. The difference is that the committee
suspension system permits the committee to interfere with the rule
only temporarily pending final legislative action by statute, in con-
trast to the veto system which permits the last word of the legisla-
tive process to be the one-house or two-house resolution.
As illustrated by the conflicting dicta of the New Hampshire and
West Virginia courts,8 2 a tribunal that rejects the one-house or
two-house veto as a violation of separation of powers may or may
not accept the committee suspension system. One interpretation of
separation of powers would reject the committee suspension sys-
tem because it provides an opportunity for the legislature, without
enacting a statute, to interfere with the agency's execution of the
laws. A contrary interpretation is that the committee suspension
system provides only a temporary interference that is ancillary to
the conceded power of the legislature to take final action by
statute.
The latter approach appears to be especially persuasive if the
committee suspension system is designed to meet a demonstrated
need in a manner that minimizes the constitutional problem. The
need can be demonstrated, for example, if the committee suspen-
sion system applies only to rules that were adopted during the in-
terim between legislative sessions, because the legislature obviously
is unable to enact a statute during the interim. Significantly, the
constitutional amendments adopted in Michigan and South Da-
kota authorize committee suspension only for rules adopted during
the interim between legislative sessions.83
The constitutional problem attending a committee suspension
system may be minimized if the statute that creates this system
requires the committee to base its decision on criteria clearly ex-
pressed in the statute. For example, the statute might authorize
82. Supra notes 18, 19, 78 & 79 and accompanying text.
83. Supra note 81.
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the committee to suspend an agency rule only if the rule is con-
trary to the intent of the enabling statute or otherwise beyond the
authority delegated to the agency.14 The system also should re-
quire the committee to follow appropriate procedures before reach-
ing its decision. These procedures might include holding a public
hearing after notice to the agency and to affected parties.8 5 Fur-
ther, the system should permit the committee to suspend a rule for
only a limited time and should require the legislature to act within
a short time after the committee's action.88 Allowing tlie committee
to exercise its suspensive powers only during the interim between
legislative sessions may provide further protection to the system
against constitutional challenge.87 With these limitations, a com-
mittee suspension system should stand a good chance of passing
constitutional muster as a temporary mechanism that is ancillary
to the legislature's exercise of its power to enact a statute.
Reports by states with committee suspension systems indicate
that the suspension power has been exercised with commendable
restraint; additionally, the availability of this power has given the
legislative committee considerable bargaining power in its informal
dealings with the agencies."
84. Alaska, Minnesota, and Tennessee give no criterion for restricting the committee's
suspensive power. Kentucky permits committee suspension if the agency's rule is contrary
to legislative intent or beyond statutory authority. North Carolina lists only the lack of
statutory authority as the basis for the committee to suspend a rule. The other committee
suspension statutes confer considerable amounts of subjective judgment on the committees
to suspend rules on "any other" grounds (Alabama), based on the "needs of the people"
(Nebraska), if the rules are not "necessary" (South Dakota), or are "arbitrary, capricious,"
or the cause of "undue hardship" (Wisconsin). Statutes are cited supra note 15.
85. Nebraska, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin require the committee to hold a
hearing. Alaska requires an opportunity for a hearing. The other committee suspension
states are either silent or permissive with regard to a hearing. Statutes are cited supra note
15.
86. All the committee suspension statutes impose limits on the duration of the suspension
that may be imposed by the committee expressed either as a number of days or as terminat-
ing if the legislature has failed to take final action nullifying the rule by the end of the
current or the next legislative session. Statutes are cited supra note 15.
87. This factor goes to the seriousness of the need for committee suspension. On the ques-
tion of need, see supra text accompanying notes 54-58.
88. See, e.g., Regulatory Reform and Congressional Review of Agency Rules, supra note
73, statement by Rep. Davis, Tennessee (Part I at 905). Similar statements were made about
the exercise of committee suspensive powers in states that have two-house veto systems and
are therefore classified elsewhere in this article. Supra note 13. See, e.g., REGULATORY RE-
FORM AND CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULES, supra note 73, statements by Prof.
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D. Committee Objection Shifts Burden in Litigation
Three states and the 1981 revision of the Model State Adminis-
trative Procedure Act provide for final legislative action only by
statute pursuant to guidance from an advisory committee. If the
committee objects to a rule and the agency does not change the
rule to the committee's satisfaction, the committee's objection is
published with the rule. 9 In any litigation in which the validity of
the rule is at issue, the burden of persuasion is shifted, and the
agency has the burden of convincing the court that the rule is
valid. Two of these states offer an incentive to litigants seeking to
challenge rules by providing for the award of reasonable costs and
attorney's fees to a party who successfully challenges a rule after
the committee has objected. 0
The systems that empower a legislative committee to shift the
burden in litigation are subject to the theoretical criticism that the
statutes do not provide a systematic mechanism for any action by
the legislature to review the committee's action. Hence, the com-
mittee's action is the final action of the legislature, unless the legis-
lature chooses to enact a statute to override the committee, a pro-
cedure not described in the statutes but presumably available as
an exercise of the inherent authority of the legislature to control
its own committees. Even if the committee's action is the final ac-
Neely, West Virginia (Part I at 883), Rep. Osiecki, Connecticut (Part I at 1070), Mr. Sand-
ers (special counsel), Michigan (Part I at 1104).
89. Supra note 16. Montana also provides for a shift of the burden, but Montana's system
is classified here as a two-house veto system because it incorporates the two-house veto
system. Supra note 13.
The Montana burden-shifting mechanism includes some unique features. If the legisla-
ture is not in session, the committee may poll the members of the legislature, and shall poll
them if at least 20 members of the legislature object to the proposed rule. If a poll of the
members of the legislature shows that a majority of each house finds the proposed rule is
contrary to legislative invent, the rule shall be presumed conclusively to be contrary to legis-
lative intent in any court proceedings on the validity of the rule. When the members of the
legislature are not polled, an objection by the Montana committee shifts the burden to the
agency, in any litigation, to persuade the court that the rule is valid. The Montana statute
also confers standing upon the rules review committee to litigate regarding the validity of a
rule.
90. The states providing costs and attorney's fees are Iowa and North Dakota. Statutes
are cited supra note 16. The 1981 MSAPA, supra note 16, does not provide for attorney's
fees, but permits them if another statute does. The Vermont statute is silent regarding at-
torney's fees.
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tion of the legislature, however, this action is neither the at-
tempted enactment of a statute nor an interference in the agency's
execution of the law; the committee's action is merely an allocation
of the burden of persuasion in litigation, a matter that tradition-
ally has been regarded as being within the domain of the legisla-
ture.91 Delegation of this power to a legislative committee, subject
to the possibility of action by statute but without a systematic
mechanism for action by statute, is on the strongest constitutional
ground if the statute creating the system establishes clear grounds
on which the committee may object and requires the committee to
conduct satisfactory procedures before making its objection. 92 The
Iowa Supreme Court implied that Iowa's system, providing for a
shift of the burden if the legislative committee objects, was consti-
tutional; the court, however, did not explore the issue of delegation
from the legislature to its committee.s
The system that shifts the burden in litigation if the legislative
committee objects to a rule is not beyond constitutional chal-
lenge.94 This system, however, appears to pose less serious consti-
tutional problems than either the one-house or two-house veto or
the committee suspension system. This system offers a middle
ground, with minimal constitutional risk, between the advisory
committee system and the one-house or two-house veto or the
committee suspension system.
E. Applicability
The systems discussed above generally are applicable across-the-
board to all or virtually all rules of all agencies in the jurisdiction.
In addition, or as an alternative, some jurisdictions have adopted
one or more systems of legislative control applicable only to lim-
ited categories of rules adopted by designated agencies. The fed-
91. See, e.g., 1981 MSAPA, supra note 16, (Comment to § 3-204); Bonfield, The Iowa
Administrative Procedure Act: Background, Construction, Applicability, Public Access to
Agency Law, The Rulemaking Process, 60 IOWA L. REv. 731, 921 (1975).
92. See sources cited supra note 91 and the discussion of analogous issues arising from
committee suspension systems. Supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
93. Schmitt v. Iowa Dep't of Social Services, 263 N.W.2d 739 (Iowa 1978). The statute
was applied in Iowa Auto Dealers Ass'n v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 301 N.W.2d 760 (Iowa
1981).
94. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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eral statutes that were invalidated in Chadha95 and Consumer En-
ergy Council9" provided for a one-house veto of limited categories
of rules. Limited systems of a one-house or two-house veto also
exist in a few states.9
Even in across-the-board systems, some types of rulemaking re-
ceive special treatment or exemption. Examples of special treat-
ment include emergency rules,98 rules adopted during the interim
between legislative sessions," and rules required by federal stat-
ute. 100 In addition, a number of jurisdictions distinguish between
the review of proposed rules and existing rules.1'0
The varied patterns of applicability have a bearing on the ques-
tion of whether any one or more types of legislative control are
essential components of government. The existence of numerous
models of systems and the varying applicability of any particular
model suggest that no model and no method of applicability is
essential.
IV. MODELS OF EXECUTIVE CONTROL
Executive control over the rulemaking and other actions of ad-
ministrative agencies is emerging as a topic of serious concern. If
agencies are perceived to be exceeding their authority, the possibil-
ity of supervision by the chief executive requires consideration as
an alternative or as a supplement to supervision by the legislature.
The existing systems of executive control can be classified into a
few models and are discussed next. Hybrid systems will be dis-
cussed under a later heading.
95. Supra note 5.
96. Supra note 6.
97. Arizona and Pennsylvania (supra note 10); Maryland, Missouri, and Texas (supra
note 11).
98. Maryland, South Carolina, and West Virginia (supra note 11); Oklahoma (supra note
12); Connecticut, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, and Virginia (supra note 13); Alaska and
Tennessee (supra note 15).
99. Michigan and Ohio (supra note 13); Alaska (supra note 15).
100. South Carolina (supra note 11); New Jersey and Ohio (supra note 13).
101. Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Nevada, South Carolina, Texas, and West Virginia
(supra note 11); Oklahoma (supra note 12); Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada,
and Virginia (supra note 13); Kentucky (supra note 15); North Dakota (supra note 16).
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A. Nonsystematic Executive Control
The most widespread model is one in which there is no system-
atic means by which the chief executive controls the rulemaking or
other activities of administrative agencies. Most states fall into this
category and, until recently, so did the federal government. The
chief executive is not, however, without influence even in jurisdic-
tions that have no systematic mechanisms for executive review of
agency action. Traditional powers of the chief executive include
the power to initiate requests for appropriations and other legisla-
tion pertaining to the agencies, the power to veto any statute, the
power to appoint agency heads and other senior personnel, the
power to control criminal prosecution and to grant clemency, and
the general power of persuasion that inheres in the office of chief
executive.
In those states where the constitution creates some administra-
tive agencies, such as public utilities commissions or boards of edu-
cation, the constitution may limit the supervisory power of the
governor with regard to these agencies."l 2 Even where a statute
rather than the constitution establishes an agency, the legislature
may, to some extent, restrict the scope of gubernatorial control by
conferring upon the agency head a relatively wide range of inde-
pendence from the governor. Similarly, Congress has chosen to
confer more autonomy upon the "independent" federal agencies
than upon the "executive" departments, although Congress created
each category of agency.103
A basic difficulty with the nonsystematic model is that it can
lead to uneven and erratic instances of executive control. A chief
executive may ignore completely rulemaking and other agency ac-
tivities most of the time, but periodically he may intervene in
agency actions that raise issues of high political significance. A re-
lated difficulty is that the precise scope of the chief executive's in-
fluence over the agencies is seldom clear; consequently, each at-
tempted use of the chief executive's power may raise a unique set
102. See supra note 64 for the analogous question of the limits of legislative control over
agencies that derive their existence and powers from the constitution.
103. See generally 1 K. C. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 2:7-2:9 (2d ed. 1978);
B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 13-16 (1976).
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of jurisdictional problems.'0 4
B. Executive Approval or Clearance as Condition of Effective-
ness of Rules
In three states, rules do not become effective until signed by the
governor.10 5 These systems have been established by statute in the
respective states. They raise no constitutional problems if
rulemaking is regarded as part of the executive function of execut-
ing the laws. This view of the executive nature of rulemaking is
consistent with the recent approach taken by the state and federal
courts invoking the separation of powers principle as the basis for
invalidating statutes that created the one-house or two-house veto
system. These courts held that, although the legislature always re-
tains the power to change the law by enacting a new statute, the
legislature may not interfere with the executive function of adopt-
ing rules to implement the law. In conformity with this reasoning,
these statutes can be justified as legislative choices to delegate
rulemaking power to the agencies subject to the lawful condition of
prior approval of each rule by the chief executive.
A constitutional issue would arise if an executive order rather
than a statute imposed the requirement of prior approval of the
chief executive. The question then would be whether the chief ex-
ecutive has inherent power to impose this type of control over the
rulemaking of all agencies under the general constitutional duty to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed, or whether the chief
executive can impose this type of control over the agencies only if
the legislature incorporates prior executive approval as part of the
legislative delegation of authority to the agencies.
Arizona has a requirement, imposed by executive order, that the
chief executive approve all rules before they take effect.' Presi-
dent Reagan took a significant step in this direction in issuing Ex-
ecutive Order 12,291 on February 17, 1981.107 This Executive Or-
104. The problems may be especially difficult if the chief executive relies on inherent
constitutional power without statutory authority. See infra notes 106-09.
105. Supra note 25.
106. Exec. Order No. 81-3 (May 8, 1981), 1981 Ariz. Legis. Serv. A-215, - 216 (West).
107. Supra note 9. A Pennsylvania Executive Order takes a similar approach. Exec. Order
No. 1981-2 (Jan. 29, 1981), 11 Pa. Admin. Bull. 1379 (Apr. 25, 1981). For a critical comment,
see Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of Agency
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der requires all agencies, except the independent regulatory
agencies, l"' to submit all proposed and final rules for review to the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) who is
subject to the direction of a special task force consisting mainly of
cabinet members under the direction of the Vice President. Tech-
nically, neither the OMB nor the task force may suspend or nullify
a proposed or existing rule. As a practical matter, however, the
OMB and the task force provide a highly influential system of
prior clearance of rules, and the President could influence directly
the OMB and the task force in performing this clearance function.
The validity of this Executive Order is likely to depend on the
outcome of three inquiries. The first is whether the OMB controls
agency rulemaking, or whether OMB's relationship to the agencies
is purely advisory. The second question is whether Congress, in
creating and maintaining the agencies of the executive department,
has implied its consent to the agencies being tightly controlled by
the President in a manner that is, to a considerable extent, left to
the discretion of the President from time to time. This implication
may be drawn from the distinction that Congress has made be-
tween the independent agencies, which receive certain congres-
sional protection from presidential control, and the executive agen-
cies, which do not. This distinction could be interpreted as
implying that Congress intends to leave the executive agencies
under the substantial control of the President.
The third question involves separation of powers. If this Execu-
tive Order does indeed result in OMB control over the rulemaking
of the executive agencies, and if Congress has not given its implied
consent, does the President's constitutional power to ensure that
the laws are faithfully executed authorize him, without statutory
support, to require the agencies to submit their rules for his ap-
Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REv. 193 (1981). See generally
Symposium: Presidential Intervention in Administrative Rulemaking, 56 Tul. L. Rev. 811
(1982).
108. The Executive Order lists 17 "independent regulatory agencies" by name and states
that it is not applicable to them or to "any other similar agency designated by statute as a
Federal independent regulatory agency or commission." The President has asked all inde-
pendent agencies to comply voluntarily with the procedures contained in the Executive Or-
der. Professor Kenneth C. Davis reported recently that all but one of the independent agen-
cies had declined. K.C. DAVIS, ADMI UsTRATVE LAW TREATISE § 6:40 (Supp. 1982).
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proval as a condition of the effectiveness of the rules? A tentative
answer to this question may resemble the tentative answer to the
question raised earlier in this paper regarding the constitutionality
of a statute creating a one-house or two-house veto of agencies'
rules: the constitution may be unclear on the subject, and the out-
come of a challenge may be influenced by the seriousness of the
need and the availability of alternative methods of meeting the
need that pose less serious constitutional questions.1 9
A less controversial model of executive approval or clearance as
a precondition to the effectiveness of rules is found in the numer-
ous states in which agencies must submit all rules to the attorney
general for approval as to legality before they become effective."'
This requirement apparently rests on the attorney general's role as
legal advisor to government. In some states, the attorney general
also serves as staff counsel for some or all agencies, and in these
situations, the assistant attorney general who is assigned as agency
counsel may draft the rules for the agency; drafting and approval
of the rules may then be a single function of the attorney general's
office.
C. Executive Veto of Existing Rules
In some states and under the 1981 revision of the Model State
Administrative Procedure Act, rules can become effective without
prior submission to the governor, but they are subject to subse-
quent veto by the governor."1 These systems are created by stat-
ute and can be justified to the same extent as the model discussed
above that provides for executive approval or clearance of rules
before their adoption. If, without a statute, a governor asserted the
power to veto an existing rule, constitutional issues would arise
similar to those discussed above in connection with Executive Or-
der 12,291.
California has statutorily adopted a variation of the executive
109. See, by analogy, the discussion of the least burdensome means and the question of
necessity, supra text accompanying notes 54-58.
110. See, e.g., Comm. on the Office of Attorney Gen., National Ass'n of Attorneys Gen.,
REPORT ON THE OFFICE OF ATrORNEY GENERAL 340-43 (1971); 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMIns-
TRATIVE LAW 220-21 (1965); Bonfield, supra note 91, at 899 n.662.
111. Supra note 26.
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veto of agency rules.-1 2 The Office of Administrative Law systemat-
ically reviews all rules to determine whether the rules satisfy stan-
dards contained in the statute.11 3 The Office has power to suspend
rules subject to final review by the governor. If the governor's
power to veto rules is acknowledged, the power of the Office of Ad-
ministrative Law to suspend rules subject to review by the gover-
nor can be analogized to the power of a legislative committee
under a committee suspension system to suspend rules temporarily
pending final action by enactment of a statute.11 4 The functions of
the Office of Administrative Law, like those of a legislative suspen-
sion committee, could be viewed as temporary and as ancillary to
the powers of the final decision-maker. These ancillary functions
might well withstand constitutional challenge if supported by a de-
monstrable need and if accompanied by clear statutory standards,
appropriate procedures, and a reasonably tight timetable for final
action by the ultimate authority.
D. Executive Participation in Legislative Oversight Systems
A few states have established hybrid systems in which the gover-
nor particpates with a legislative committee in the review of
rules. 1 In North Carolina, for example, if the legislative rule re-
view committee finds that a rule is outside the agency's statutory
authority, the committee can object and thereby delay the effec-
tiveness of the rule pending final action by the governor or the
council of state.11 If the governor (or council) takes no action
within a designated time, the rule is automatically repealed. If,
during the time limit, the governor (or council) rejects the commit-
tee's position, the rule becomes effective, but the committee must
112. Supra note 27.
113. The statutory standards are, in summary: necessity, authority, clarity, consistency,
reference, and approval of the State Building Standards Commission. See generally Starr,
California's New Office of Administrative Law and Other Amendments to the California
APA: A Bureau to Curb Bureaucracy and Judicial Review, Too, 32 AD. L. REv. 713 (1980);
OFFICE OF ADmiNSTRATIVE LAW [Cal.], FrsT ANNUAL REPORT 1980-81, SLASHING GOVERN-
mENT RED TAPE (1981).
114. See, by analogy, supra text accompanying notes 84-88.
115. Supra note 28.
116. The North Carolina council of state consists of ten executive officers, in addition to
the governor, whose offices are established by the constitution. N.C. Const. art. III, § 8. A
quorum is five members in addition to the governor. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 147-13 (1978).
[Vol. 24:79
VETO OF AGENCY RULES
prepare a bill for submission to the legislature to nullify the rule.
The committee also may seek a judicial determination that the
rule is invalid. In this or any other litigation in which the validity
of a rule is tested, the committee's objection shifts the burden to
the agency to persuade the court that the rule is valid.
The constitutional justification for the North Carolina system is
that a statute may empower the governor to veto rules, the gover-
nor may exercise this power by tacitly declining to intervene for
the designated time after the committee has objected, and a legis-
lative committee may properly be given an ancillary role in aid of
the governor's exercise of the rule review function. If any link in
this chain of justification is viewed as inadequate - and the last-
mentioned link is questionable - the system loses its constitu-
tional basis.
E. Administrative Determination of Invalidity of Rule
In Florida, upon complaint of a party adversely affected by a
rule, a hearing officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings
must conduct a declaratory proceeding to determine whether the
rule is invalid.117 A hearing officer's determination in this proceed-
ing is not reviewable by the agency which promulgated the rule,
but is subject to judicial review. The Missouri Administrative
Hearing Commission exercises similar jurisdiction to invalidate
agencies' rules.118
V. CONCLUSION
Some systematic means of rule review seems desirable in view of
current popular demands for the accountability of administrative
agencies. The system should not burden the agencies so much that
they attempt to proceed without adopting rules at all; neither
should the system burden the legislature or the executive with the
need to constantly reconsider the same matter.
The one-house or two-house veto is questionable on constitu-
tional and policy grounds. 1 ' It is also unnecessary as evidenced by
117. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 120-.54(4), 120.56 (West Supp. 1981-1982).
118. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 161.333 to .338, 536.050 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
119. In addition to other sources cited in this Article, see the strong policy objections
made against the one-house or two-house veto by the Administrative Conference of the
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the numerous alternatives that have worked with apparent success
in various jurisdictions.
Each of the other types of legislative or executive rule review has
its advantages and disadvantages. Some jurisdictions have adopted
multiple types of rule review.120 Various types of systems or multi-
ple systems are apparently workable, and success may depend
more upon the effectiveness of the personnel than upon the official
structure of the system.
United States. Legislative Veto of Administrative Regulations (Recommendation 77-1), 1
C.F.R. § 305.77-1 (1982). See also Federal Regulation: Roads to Reform, 1979 ABA COMMIS-
SION ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY 88-91. The continuing opposition of the ABA to the concept
of the one-house or two-house veto is demonstrated in the brief filed by the ABA as amicus
curiae in the Chadha case in the Supreme Court. Supra note 5. The ABA brief was inserted
into the Congressional Record by Senator Bumpers. 128 CONG. REC. S2205 (daily ed. Mar.
16, 1982).
On the general topic of alternatives to the one-house or two-house veto, see Kaiser, Con-
gressional Action to Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives to the "Legislative Veto," 32 AD.
L. REv. 667 (1980).
120. The United States will be in this category if the Senate Bill, supra note 1, becomes
law. See discussion of executive review, supra note 9. States that have multiple systems of
review include: Florida (supra notes 11 & 117); Hawaii (supra notes 11 & 25); Iowa (supra
notes 16 & 26); Louisiana (supra notes 13 & 26); Missouri (supra notes 11, 26 & 118); Ne-
braska (supra notes 15 & 25); Nevada (supra notes 13 & 26); North Carolina (supra notes
15 & 28); Wyoming (supra notes 11, 25 & 28); and the 1981 MSAPA (supra notes 16 & 26).
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APPENDIX A
Type of Final Legislative Action that Can
Invalidate Agencies' Rules
The federal government and eleven states have no across-the-
board system of legislative oversight of agencies' rules. Supra note
10. Some of these jurisdictions have adopted one-house or two-
house veto systems for designated types of rules, but in general,
these jurisdictions rely on the general power of the legislature to
enact a statute as the sole mechanism by which the legislature can
invalidate the rules of agencies.
The thirty-nine other states have adopted various types of
across-the-board mechanisms for legislative oversight of agencies'
rules. Supra notes 11 & 16. The following tabulation lists, for each
of these thirty-nine states, the type of final legislative action that
can invalidate the rules of agencies.
A crucial issue, for purposes of the analysis throughout this Arti-
cle, is whether the legislative action that invalidates a rule must be
submitted to the chief executive for approval or veto. Most of the
terms that are used to describe legislative action have uniform
meanings regarding whether a particular type of legislative action
must be submitted to the chief executive. Thus, in the following
table, based on the apparently uniform meaning of the respective
terms, legislative action by "statute," "law," "bill," "legislation," or
"appropriate legislative action" must be submitted to the governor,
but legislative action by "concurrent resolution" need not.
The term "joint resolution," however, does not have a uniform
meaning. Federal law makes a distinction between joint resolutions
(submitted to the President) and concurrent resolutions (not sub-
mitted). Congressional Quarterly Service, GuIDE TO CONGRESS 105-
06 (1971); 1A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION § 29.03, .04 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1972); Gibson, Congressional
Concurrent Resolutions: An Aid to Statutory Interpretation? 37
A.B.A.J. 421 (1951); Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administra-
tion by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 HARv. L.
REV. 569 (1953). Some states use the term "joint resolution" as it is
used in the federal context, requiring submission to the chief exec-
utive. In other states, however, joint resolutions are not submitted
to the governor.
1982]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
In this tabulation, an explanation is added to the states that
provide for final legislative action by "joint resolution," to indicate
whether submission to the governor is required. Also, the "legisla-
tive order" of the Wyoming statute is explained. Statutory cita-
tions to the statutes on rule review are found supra notes 11-16.
Alabama - joint resolution - submitted to governor, Ala.
Const. art. IV, § 66, art. V, § 125.
Alaska - concurrent resolution (held unconstitutional because
not submitted to governor. See supra note 17).
Arkansas - legislation.
Colorado - legislation.
Connecticut - concurrent resolution.
Florida - legislation.
Georgia - concurrent resolution - submitted to governor un-
less passed by two-thirds of each house - classified here as a stat-
ute (see discussion supra note 11).
Hawaii - appropriate legislative action.
Idaho - concurrent resolution.
Illinois - joint resolution - not submitted to governor, Ill.
Const. art. 4, § 9; letter to author from David R. Miller, Staff At-
torney, Research Department, Illinois Legislative Council (May 4,
1982).
Iowa - joint resolution that, according to the statute creating
the system, must be submitted to the governor.
Kansas - concurrent resolution.
Kentucky - bill or joint resolution - submitted to governor,
Ky. Const. § 89; letter to author from Courtenay J. Walker, Dep-
uty Director, Kentucky Legislative Research Commission (May 6,
1982).
Louisiana - concurrent resolution.
Maine - amendment of law.
Maryland - appropriate legislative action.
Michigan - concurrent resolution in some situations, bill in
others.
Minnesota - bill.
Missouri - (implies that statute is required - proposed consti-
tutional amendment is pending that would empower legislature, by
concurrent resolution, to nullify agencies' rules. See supra note
23).
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0Montana - joint resolution - not submitted to governor, Mont.
Const. art. VI, § 10 (a Montana trial court recently held part of
this statute invalid because it provides for rule control by joint res-
olution which, in Montana, is not submitted to the governor. See
supra note 21).
Nebraska - bill.
Nevada - concurrent resolution.
New Jersey - concurrent resolution.
New York - (implies that statute is required).
North Carolina - bill.
North Dakota - (implies that statute is required).
Ohio - concurrent resolution.
Oklahoma - resolution by either house.
Oregon - legislation.
South Carolina - joint resolution - submitted to governor, S.C.
Const. art. IV, § 21; Legislative Manual of the South Carolina Gen-
eral Assembly 155 (1982).
South Dakota - (implies that statute is required).
Tennessee - joint resolution - submitted to governor, Tenn.
Const. art. 3, § 18.
Texas - (implies that statute is required).
Vermont - statute.
Virginia - joint resolution - not submitted to governor, Va.
Const. art. V, § 6; letter to author from John A. Banks, Jr., Direc-
tor, Virginia Division of Legislative Services (May 5, 1982).
Washington - legislation.
West Virginia - concurrent resolution (held unconstitutional
because not submitted to governor.-See supra note 19).
Wisconsin - bill.
Wyoming - legislative order - submitted to governor, Wyo.
Const. art. 3, § 41; letter to author from Ralph E. Thomas, Direc-
tor, Wyoming Legislative Service Office (May 4, 1982) (indicating
that the governor's authority to veto joint resolutions has been es-
tablished by practice, although the issue has not been litigated).
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APPENDIX B
Significance of Referenda that Reject Proposed State
Constitutional Amendments
The people of four states have rejected proposed state constitu-
tional amendments that would have authorized the one-house or
two-house veto. Supra notes 22 & 44. These referenda may be
viewed from two perspectives - as statements of constitutional
law and as statements of public policy.
Constitutional Law
Assume that after the electorate of a state has rejected a pro-
posed constitutional amendment that would have authorized a
one-house or two-house veto, the legislature enacts a statute creat-
ing the very type of system that had been rejected in the referen-
dum. Assume further that the state has no judicial precedent on
point. In litigation challenging the statute, should the state courts
hold it unconstitutional on the grounds that it is contrary to the
outcome of the referendum? For purposes of this hypothetical, let
us disregard other grounds that may motivate the court to hold the
statute invalid.
One approach is to argue that, because a popular vote binds the
courts when the people have adopted a constitutional amendment,
see, e.g., T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
55 (repub. Da Capo 1972) (1st ed. Boston 1868); 16 AM. JuR. 2d,
ConstitutionalkLaw § 92 (1979), the courts should give equal defer-
ence to the will of the people as expressed or clearly implied in a
popular vote which rejects a proposed constitutional amendment.
This is not to say that public expressions of opinion always
should be taken into account when a court engages in constitu-
tional interpretation. To the contrary, many objections can be
raised against the use of public opinion for these purposes. First,
public opinion is often difficult to ascertain. This objection does
not, however, pose a serious obstacle in the present context, be-
cause the state constitutional referenda furnish perhaps the most
reliable vehicle for ascertaining the views of the public on an issue
of governmental concern.
A second objection to the use of a referendum as a vehicle of
constitutional interpretation is that some constitutional provisions
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are designed to protect the minority against the risk of tyranny by
the majority. The majority ultimately may be able to amend the
constitution in a manner that would injure the minority. Until the
majority can procure a constitutional amendment, however, the
courts should defend the rights of minorities as guaranteed by the
existing constitution, even if the protection of minorities' rights of-
fends the majority. This objection, however, also does not appear
to be pertinent to the present discussion. While some of the state
constitutional referenda may have been affected by secret agendas
or by the personal prestige of prominent individuals, there is no
indication that any of these referenda were, in effect, referenda on
the rights of minorities.
A third objection is that a referendum may appeal to the self-
interest of the electors, and thus may reflect their combined self-
interest rather than their philosophical view of government. This
objection could be raised, for example, if a referendum concerned
tax rates. In the present context, however, there is no indication
that tax minimization or any other form of self-interest was a con-
trolling hidden agenda in the four state referenda.
In summary, these state constitutional referenda offer a reliable
reading of the will of the people in the four states on the question
whether the one-house or two-house veto is a desirable feature of
state government. The majority in each state has answered in the
negative, thereby rejecting the proposals of their own legislators.
The argument in favor of giving binding effect to the negative
vote of the people finds some support in two analogous situations.
First, in the interpretation of statutes, the prevailing view is that a
court will take into account the negative implications arising from
the legislature's rejection of a proposed amendment. 73 AM. JUR.
2d, Statutes § 171 (1979); 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AN STATU-
TORY CONSTRUCTION § 48.18 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1973). Second, in the
interpretation of constitutions as well as statutes, the maxim "ex-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius" leads to the negative implica-
tion that if one item has been expressed, other alternative pos-
sibilities are excluded. SUTHERLAND, supra at § 47.23, .24; COOLEY,
supra at 64. If the people's silence can have a negative effect by
implication, the people's vote that expressly rejects a proposed
constitutional amendment should be given even greater effect, be-
cause their vote is an express rather than an implied indication of
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the will of the people.
Arguments can be asserted against giving binding effect to the
people's negative vote. The prevailing view of the people may have
been that the subject matter should be omitted from the constitu-
tion to leave flexibility for the near future, or that the proposed
constitutional amendment was unnecessary because the legislature
already appeared to have the authority to establish the one-house
or two-house veto system. Further, even if the people rejected the
proposed amendment because they wanted to prevent the creation
of a one-house or two-house veto system, negative implications ar-
guably should not be drawn from referenda that reject proposed
state constitutional amendments. Under the latter view, the only
way that the people assuredly can prevent the creation of a one-
house or two-house veto is by adopting a constitutional amend-
ment that contains language clearly prohibiting such a system. Fi-
nally, the lapse of time after the referendum is likely to progres-
sively weaken the judicial inclination to give binding effect to any
negative implications of the referendum.
Whether a state court considers itself bound by a referendum
that rejects a proposed cozustitutional amendment, the court is
likely to take the referendum into account as a significant state-
ment of public policy.
Public Policy
As statements of public policy, the referenda in the four states
have strong persuasive effect, which is at its maximum in those
states, but which also merits serious attention in other states and
in the federal government.
As regards the federal government, an additional factor requires
consideration. The people of these four states expressed their view
about the one-house or two-house veto as regards their respective
state governments. Conceivably, a voter in any of these four states,
while rejecting the one-house or two-house veto for that state's
government, may have been willing to see this veto adopted for the
federal government. Such willingness, however, seems unlikely in
view of the similar governmental structures and the shared tradi-
tions of the federal and state governments. Even if the impact of
the four state constitutional referenda is less persuasive on the fed-
eral government than on the other states, the state referenda merit
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serious consideration at the federal level, especially because the
federal constitutional issue regarding the validity of the one-house
or two-house veto is unresolved, and the federal government has
not conducted its own referendum on the issue.
